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Summary: The question of who benefits and who loses from the transition, the 
channels and mechanisms of redistribution of wealth in the post-communist period, and 
the relation between redistribution and monetary regime are, in our opinion, 
fundamental in understanding theoretically the deep systemic changes in Eastern 
Europe. This article has two basic tasks – one empirical and one theoretical. Our 
empirical task is to analyse the dynamics of the financial wealth of the institutional 
sectors in Bulgaria in the period 1998-2005 and to identify the major net creditors and 
net debtors.  The empirical data used for the purpose are based on adapted methodology 
for the financial account of the Bulgarian economy according to the requirements of the 
System of National Accounts (SNA). Econometric simulations have been carried out of 
the major factors conditioning the change in the sectoral financial wealth. The empirical 
investigations are given in Part 3. Our theoretical task is to prove the hypothesis (which 
is to a large extent supported by the empirical results) about the functional relationship 
between the dynamics of redistribution and the change in monetary regime. This is 
presented in Part 2 and is discussed in Part 4.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
One major question of the post-communist period, which has not been clearly 
answered, is about who benefits and who loses from the transition
1.  
The radical and on the whole unexpected systematic change (from a planned socialist 
to a market capitalist economy) caused a considerable redistribution of the wealth, 
ownership and capital. It was associated with the appearance of new actors either by 
transforming or disappearing of the old ones. Initial accumulation of capital and ownership 
took place by converting power resources into money and property. Liabilities and losses 
moved over to large groups of the population while a small part concentrated into its hands 
the profitable activities, mostly through the intermediation of the state and the banking 
system (also state-owned by character). While some new self-made businessmen also 
appeared, the nation’s wealth was in general concentrated into the hands of those in power 
(also political) in the old planned system. Of course, it is difficult to say to what extent this 
type of transition was controllable, planned and whether it was at all possible to carry it out 
in a different and more equitable manner. It is also hard to find an answer to the question as 
to whether any other type of institutional change could have been possible and whether an 
fair and effective transition model could apriori be chosen anyway
2.  
The post-socialist dynamics of the Bulgarian economy provides a number of specific 
possibilities for analysis, due to the specific time lines defined by the crisis and the 
subsequent change of monetary regime in mid 1997. Through the currency board (CB) the 
latest economic history of the country is divided into two symmetrically opposed periods, 
which characterize not only different monetary regimes and different types of economic 
policy, but also periods in which different types of actors dominate (in the first case this is 
a period of debtors, and of creditors in the second). The relation between the monetary 
regime and the redistribution of wealth is obvious although rarely analysed. This relation 
prompts the logical question of how long a monetary regime would possibly preserve a 
certain status quo in a distribution of wealth
3.  
                                                 
1 In fact this is one of the basic questions of every historical transition; see Buharin (1989, [1920]). 
2 Indisputably, the transition model, despite some specifics (which are often exaggerated), was observed in all 
former communist countries (Hodgson, 2006, Colombatto, 2006, Winiecki, 2004, Beck and Laeven, 2005, 
Pejovic, 2003, Starodobrovskaya and Mau, 2004, Bunich, 2005, etc.).  
3In other words, how much and how long an institution retains its utility (marginal utility).    3
Not only from historical perspective is it interesting to analyse the redistribution in 
the transition period.  Bulgaria’s membership in the EU and its future accession to the euro 
area pose a number of formal and informal criteria of convergence and similarity of the 
Bulgarian economy, without the fulfilment of which the monetary policy would be 
ineffective
4. The question is about how similar to those of the euro area countries the 
transmission monetary mechanisms are, and how similar to the European behaviour the 
behaviour of the individual sectors (actors) in the Bulgarian economy is. Although rarely 
mentioned, the issues of financial wealth redistribution could logically be related to the 
theory of currency areas (regardless of whether these are optimal, endogenous or political). 
Because it is not one and the same where (which sector) the wealth belongs to, where the 
liquid part of this wealth is, etc. The role of redistribution is closely related with the state of 
the credit channel and the role of the financial system for the monetary transmission 
mechanism.   
Much has been written about the “bad crony” dynamics of transition. Recently, this 
has become somewhat a fashion, which is largely dictated by the increasing importance 
attached to the institutional, political and cultural factors and to the critique of the neo-
classical approach to the reforms in Eastern Europe (often referred to as the Washington 
consensus).  
Unfortunately, empirical analyses are rarely offered, mainly as a result of the lack of 
adequate methodology of quantitative analyses (Nenovsky, Rizopoulos, 2004). The 
difficulties and limitations confronted by the empirical analysis of redistribution are 
obvious and could be reduced to three basic ones: (i) there are statistical data and series 
about the standardised sectors of economy (households, general government, non-financial 
enterprises, banking system, etc.), which are used for a different type of analyses and 
because they are aggregated they do not tell much about what we are interested in; (ii) 
there are difficulties in identifying the actors who do not wish to be uncovered, and (iii) 
there are difficulties in identifying the wealth, assets and liabilities of those actors.  
The above limitations pose a number of insurmountable barriers to knowledge. 
Nevertheless, we believe that waiting is not the best solution. It is possible to make the first 
steps, which, to the extent the available data and the internationally recognised 
methodology permit, could give us the opportunity to come to some conclusions in respect 
to the dynamics of redistribution of wealth and the relation of this redistribution with the 
                                                 
4 Is that really so?   4
monetary regime. [It is interesting that even such type of analyses is rarely performed. In 
Bulgaria, only in recent years attempts have been made to construct the financial account 
(part of SNA), which makes it possible to trace the dynamics of the redistribution of 
financial wealth (Mihaylova, 2004, 2006)].  
This article has two major goals – one empirical and one theoretical. Our empirical 
goal is to analyse the dynamics of the financial wealth of the institutional sectors in 
Bulgaria in the period 1998-2005, to identify the major net creditors and net debtors and to 
carry out econometric examination of the key factors in the dynamics of the sectoral 
financial wealth. The empirical results are given in Part 3. Our theoretical task is to prove 
the hypothesis (which is largely confirmed by the empirical results) about the functional 
relation between the dynamics of redistribution and the change of the monetary regime. 
This is given in Part 2 and is discussed in Part 4.  
 
II.  Evolution of the financial wealth in Bulgaria and the monetary regime (1989-
2005): The hypothesis 
 
As we mentioned above the financial crisis and the introduction of the CB (which 
replaced the discretionary central bank) divide the post-communist history of Bulgaria 
into two sub-periods of opposite economic policy models. The first period extends from 
1989 to mid 1997, the second – from mid 1997 to date.  
We will not go into chronological details. The reader can study the overviews on 
the Bulgarian transition by Dobrinsky (2000), Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004), Mihov 
(1999), Miller and Petranov (2001), Vucheva (2001), Minasyan (2002), and Ignatiev 
(2005). We will instead outline the major features and the driving factors behind the two 
economic models in the light of redistribution
5.  
In brief, Period 1 could be defined from the perspective of redistribution as a 
period of total domination of the debtor group over the creditor group. The group of 
debtors was heterogeneous and comprised mainly representatives of the state and the 
political class, the subsidised public enterprises and refinanced banks, some crony 
private banks and enterprises, and a number of ”bandit” economic formations. The 
central bank was also part of this coalition and undoubtedly serviced (whether 
                                                 
5 An original empirical attempt to capture the redistribution effects of the financial crisis (in a cross-
section by social and ethnical status, gender, age and region) is made by Adams-Kane and Lim (2005).   5
purposefully or not) the various debtors’ interests. De jure it was an independent 
institution, yet in practice it turned into a transmission mechanism of wealth to the 
benefit of the debtors. Being on top of the financial pyramid, the central bank 
systematically (once again, wilfully or not) was compelled to monetise the losses 
incurred by the enterprises, the government and the banking sector. Money was needed 
by all – the enterprises and the banks had accumulated a great amount of bad debts, and 
the government, too, with the domestic debt and deficit assuming threatening 
proportions (Table 1).  
The mechanisms of this monetisation in Bulgarian case are nothing original and 
are studied by Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004)
6. The great number of monetary policy 
instruments (especially the uncollateralized refinancing), the exchange rate policy, etc. 
were entirely in favour of certain groups of actors related as a whole with the coalition 
of debtors. The LOLR function, which is as a rule used only in extreme situations, was 
employed all the time
7 without even making any attempts to differentiate liquidity form 
solvency problems faced by the banks. The households were the main creditors and 
those that suffered most from the redistribution mechanism of scale. Since consumer 
lending was almost undeveloped, the households were net savers and their savings (in 
the form of deposits and government securities) systematically depreciated. At the same 
time, the foreign creditors of the country were concerned about the servicing of the 
external debt because of the diminishing foreign reserves (see Table 1). Thus, the 
financial crisis came as a logical outcome manifested mainly in hyperinflation, bank 
failures and the public finance crisis. The hyperinflation depreciated the debts and 
liabilities of the coalition of debtors (mainly the government), as well as the assets of the 
major domestic creditors – the households. The trajectory of the crisis led to the 
replacement of the discredited inflationary and discretionary central bank by a 
restrictive CB (the currency board was introduced on July 1, 1997)
8.  
The new regime gives more security to foreign creditors and in principle stops 
the mechanisms of monetisation of losses across the sectors of the economy.  Having 
lost their savings in the hyperinflation the households relied mainly on positive real 
interest rates to protect the purchasing power of their assets. The mechanics of the CB 
                                                 
6 About the financial crisis see also Balyozov (1999).  
7 Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004) speak of a Lender of first resort.  
8 For more details on the peculiarities of CB operation see Nenovsky and Hristov (2002), and Miller 
(1999).   6
leads to accumulation of foreign reserves, which back up the external debt payments. 
Today, the CB in Bulgaria is a restrictive regime and the LOLR functions are only 
possible under specific and strictly defined circumstances. Clearly, the Central Bank 
under a CB arrangement firmly upholds the creditors’ coalition. It is not by chance, 
justified or not, that throughout the life of the CB the representatives of the debtors’ 
group blame it for holding back the real economy, appreciating the lev, i.e. reducing the 
competitiveness of exports, etc.    
The theoretical idea about the change of the monetary regime as a result of the 
power change between the different groups of creditors (in the case of Bulgaria internal 
and external) and debtors is stated by Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003), where an 
attempt is made to illustrate it, and in Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2004) a possible 
empirical methodology is presented, which allows qualitative estimations. The 
hypothesis, which we are going to present is partially based on the above two studies; 
however, here it is formulated in a somewhat different way. It is as follows:  
 
The hypothesis: The CB introduction is an institutional change of the monetary 
regime, which leads to increasing the role of the creditors (mostly external creditors) at 
the expense of debtors. Debtors dominated in the preceding period of a discretionary 
central bank. Over time, however, the CB effect, i.е. its marginal effectiveness as a 
protector of external creditors decreases and consumer lending expands (the households 
turn more and more into debtors, although their net financial position is preserved). The 
decreasing role of the CB is increasingly compensated by the fiscal policy of the 
government, which becomes a net saver (roughly speaking from a net debtor it turns into 
net saver). More than that, there is an internal inherent mechanism which leads to a 
certain cyclicness in the positions of creditors and debtors. To a large extent the 
monetary regime itself is part of this endogenous change. [For instance, through the 
“credibility effect” CB creates incentives for consumer and housing lending to grow. 
Indeed, in Bulgaria the turn of lending to growth could be noticed only in the fifth year 
from the CB introduction, which is extremely slow compared to the experience of other 
countries under a CB arrangement and a fixed exchange rate (see Rebelo and Vegh, 
1996)].   
 
   7
III.  Empirical studies of the financial wealth (1998-2005) 
 
As we already stated the CB changed the redistribution process and the relations 
between creditors and debtors in favour of creditors. How does this dependency evolves 
over time and what does this evolution depend on are important questions, which could be 
partially answered by tracking the change in the financial wealth of economic agents, i.е. 
their net financial position and the structure of their financial assets and liabilities, which 
are determining in the classification of economic agents as debtors or creditors. The 
schematic presentation of the change in financial wealth of the institutional sectors and the 
interaction among them in the redistribution process is presented in annex (for 1998 and 
2005). The empirical inquiry of the change in the financial wealth of the institutional 
sectors and the change in the trends is made on the basis of the empirical results obtained 
from the constructed financial accounts according to the methodology proposed in the 
study of Mihaylova (2004; 2006)
9.  
 
Net wealth of the main sectors (agents) 
 
So, once again: the major economic agents in the Bulgarian economy are the 
households, the non-financial enterprises, the government and the financial enterprises 
(financial sector). Foreign creditors also play a leading part in the Bulgarian economy, 
especially before the introduction of the CB. The interests of the international institutions 
and organizations are crucial for the processes of redistribution in a small and open 
economy like Bulgaria as they provide financial resources for countervailing imbalances 
and disequilibriums. Although the role of external creditors has been gradually diminishing 
over the recent years, they still continue to have an important role in the relationship 
between creditors and debtors.    
The households are the major internal creditors and they remain to be creditors after 
the introduction of the CB. Immediately after the crisis their net financial position 
continuously grows, i.e. the net households’ financial wealth increases. The high economic 
growth in the last years, the macroeconomic stability, and the restored confidence in the 
                                                 
9 Annual financial accounts in Bulgaria start to be published in 2005 and to date there are financial accounts 
covering only a short period (2001-2004); therefore the data can not be used as yet for analysis of longer 
periods. Besides, quarterly data have not been prepared so far, which requires that the methodology of these 
studies be used largely in line with the requirements and recommendations of ESA and SNA.    8
financial system are the factors determining this increase. The financial wealth of the 
households increases at a higher rate until 2001, followed by a slowdown and more 
moderate rates of growth (Chart 1). This slowdown could be interpreted with the 
exhausting role of the monetary regime change for the financial wealth increase of the 
households due to the possibilities for realising additional benefits from the 
macroeconomic environment stabilisation and the ensured relatively predictable conditions. 
One more incentive for the further increase in the population welfare comes less from the 
positive expectations for stability than from the policy to increase the incomes for the 
households and possibilities for increasing savings in the form of financial instruments. 
The dynamics of acquired financial assets and financial wealth, respectively, follows the 
dynamics of salaries
10, which is used as a measurement of the increase of incomes for the 
households. The sector’ income increase leads to more investments in financial assets
11, but 
a unit income growth triggers a smaller increase in financial wealth, which is associated 
with a smaller propensity to save
12 and a growing portion of income used for consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Dynamics of the households’ financial assets and   
                                                 
10 The data source for wages and salaries is the account “Income formation” by economic sectors. The 
salaries do not include social contributions.  
11 The increase of investments in financial assets is higher than the increase of incomes in the form of 
salaries. 
12 Investments in real assets should also be taken into account; however, as the accounts by sector published 
by the NSI do not show any significant change, this conclusion could be drawn based on the real assets 
acquired by the households. Gross fixed capital formation of households amounts to BGN 217, 215 and 
280 million for 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively.    9
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The slowdown in the financial wealth growth of the main internal creditors is due to 
the increasing importance of the households’ borrowing funds. In the last three years the 
households have been increasingly orientated to financing their purchases of houses and 
consumption expenditures by additional lending.  
The non-financial enterprises in the Bulgarian economy stand out as the main net 
borrowers (debtors). Over the period analysed their net financial position declines with the 
exception of 2005 when a slowdown of the credit growth to the non-financial enterprises is 
observed as a result of the restrictive measures applied by the Central bank. What strikes an 
impression during the first years of the CB introduction is the almost permanent change in 
the net financial wealth of the real sector enterprises (Chart 2). This suggests that the 
change of monetary regime does not lead immediately to any significant change in the 
behaviour of debtors and no considerable redistribution of wealth is induced because of the 
CB introduction. This may serve as evidence of our proposition that the change of 
monetary regime is in the interest of creditors, and not of debtors. The non-financial 
enterprises start to deteriorate their net financial position more significantly after 2002 
when the grounds of the market mechanisms have already been laid and macroeconomic   10
stability and confidence in the institutions and the economy as a whole has been achieved. 
The predictable and stable macroeconomic environment ensures conditions for the 
enterprises to expand and finance their activities with borrowed funds not only from 
internal but also from external sources.     
Chart 2: Change in financial assets and liabilities of the non-financial 
enterprises (1998-2005) 
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Source: our estimations 
While the households and non-financial enterprises in the analysed period can 
indisputably be classified as creditors, or debtors respectively, it is hard to assign the 
Government sector to any of these categories. Before 2002 it behaves as a net debtor, and 
afterwards as net creditor for the Bulgarian economy (i.е. this sector “changed its financial 
positions”). The CB introduction is combined with the elimination of the “soft budget 
constraints” and the introduction of the so-called “hard budget constraints”, which is 
expressed in tightening the fiscal policy, discontinuing the uncontrollable financing of the 
government by the central bank and transferring the losses of the real sector to the banking 
system. These new rules lead to imposition of the rigorous fiscal policy which contributes 
to the improvement of the sector’ net financial position and realisation of budget surpluses. 
Because of the enhanced role of the fiscal policy and the gradual decrease in the role of the 
monetary policy in resolving external economic imbalances (current account deficits) it   11
could be supposed that the marginal utility (discipline and credibility) of the CB gradually 
decreases.   
Chart 3: Net financial position of the government sector (1998-2005) 
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When examining the behaviour of the banking system it can not be concluded that a 
certain group of commercial banks are net creditors or net debtors based on whether these 
are private or state banks, respectively whether they service private or state enterprises, 
something that could be seen in the period before the introduction of the CB (Nenovsky, 
Rizopoulos 2003; 2004). The market mechanisms, the competition, the strict rules imposed 
by CB do not allow any formal dependence of the commercial banks on the other economic 
agents; therefore their role is mainly that of a financial intermediator.    
 
Modelling the behaviour of the main sectors (agents)  
 
Measuring the financial wealth of the institutional sectors is useful, but it does not 
give us sufficient information about the drivers of the financial flows. Modelling the 
behaviour of economic agents (in this case sectors) makes it possible to identify the factors   12
behind one or another of behaviour of these agents and accordingly to explain the reasons 
for their increasing or decreasing net financial position
13. 
The modelling of the households’ behaviour in relation to the acquisition of financial 
assets or liabilities, respectively, indicates that the salary is among the key factors of the 
dynamics of the acquired financial assets in the household sector since the increase of 
disposable financial resources improves the possibility to save. This is confirmed by the 
econometric assessment (Table 2). In the structure of the change of financial assets held by 
the households after 1998 the deposits are more than 60% of the total change in financial 
assets (in 1998 they are 37.9%, and in 2005 – 69.9%)
14. Therefore, it would be logical to 
expect that the total change in financial assets will depend on the interest rate on deposits. 
The econometric simulations indicate a positive dependence of the net change in financial 
assets on the interest rates on term deposits denominated in BGN. Contrary, the interest 
rate on government securities does not show any statistically significant dependence on the 
change in net financial assets, which is due to the relatively small share of securities in the 
households’ assets. The exchange rate USD/BGN shows statistically significant negative 
relationship due to the fact that a higher exchange rate depreciates the local currency and 
the households acquire less lev denominated financial assets. It appears that inflation is not 
a determining factor for the behaviour of households in acquiring financial assets, which 
could be explained with the low levels of inflation after the CB introduction.   
Regarding the incurrence of financial liabilities, the determining factors for the 
households are the interest rates on loans. Their reduction leads to an increase in the 
propensity to take new credits. Obligations grow also with the increase in incomes 
measured through salaries. It is established that households make their decisions to get a 
loan based on the incomes realised in a past period. The evaluated model included dummy 
variables to reflect the impact of credit restrictions on commercial banks imposed by the 
central bank.    
 
 
                                                 
13 The estimated period covers 1998 to 2005 by using quarterly data from the compiled financial accounts 
according the methodology mentioned above. We leave aside the problematics of the high level of 
aggregation in the institutional sectors. As we already pointed out we do not have statistical data about the 
other type of actors.  
14 In 1998 deposits account for a relatively small share in the total shift of acquired financial assets of the 
household sector due to the still low level of confidence in the financial system.    13
Table 2: Models for the household sector behaviour in respect to acquired financial 
assets and incurred financial liabilities (1998-2005) 
 
Variables  ∆ Net change in financial 
assets 
∆ Net change in financial 
liabilities 
    
∆ Wages  24.61   
 (3.31)   
DUMMY0401 1130.90   
 (4.46)   
Exchange rate, end of period  -434.76   
 (-2.67)   
Interest rates on time deposits 
in BGN 
228.14  
 (2.34)   
∆ Net change in financial assets 
(-1) 
-0.43  
 (-3.68)   
∆ Net change in financial assets 
(-2) 
-0.60  
 (-5.51)   
∆ Wages (-2)    0.12 
   (1.78) 
∆ Interest rates on long-term 
credits of the households 
 -54.20 
   (-2.81) 
DUMMY 0205    -259.52 
   (-4.96) 
DUMMY 0105    104.50 
   (2.14) 
@SEAS(2)   66.22 
   (3.18) 
    
R-squared 0.78  0.68 
Adjusted R-squared  0.73  0.62 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.11  2.00 
Comment: In the brackets the t-statistics of the explaining variables are given. 
 
The acquisition of financial assets by non-financial enterprises is influenced by 
similar factors (Table 3), such as those evaluated for the households. The dynamics of the 
acquired financial assets depends on the incomes earned by firms, which we measure with 
the dynamics of the gross operating surplus and the gross mixed income
15. The interest 
rates on term deposits in BGN also indicate statistically significant “positive impact” on the 
dependent variable. Higher interest rates logically provide incentive to the enterprises to 
accumulate funds in the banking system (decisions are made by taking into account the 
                                                 
15 More specific is the use of gross operating surplus; however, no separate quarterly data are published 
about the two indicators.    14
changes in the interest rates from the preceding period, as is takes time to adapt to the new 
interest conditions and to plan activities). Another major factor appears to be the 
USD/BGN exchange rate, which has a “negative impact”. The enterprises make their 
decisions based on their past behaviour; therefore the dependent variable is included with a 
lag of one in the evaluated equation and indicates statistically significant dependence.   
It should be noted that in the first quarter of 2005 the commercial banks led a mass 
campaign to attract deposits with the purpose to increase the credit base and thus evade the 
regulations on restricting the credit growth in the country issued by the central bank. The 
credit restrictions led to a significant change in the dynamics of loans for the enterprises in 
2005-year first and second quarter. Therefore the regressions include two dummy variables 
to assess the effect of these measures.  
The enterprises take into account the related costs when they try to find financing 
resources the. The model uses intermediate consumption as approximation for the costs. 
The higher costs entail higher funding, which explain the evaluated positive dependence. 
The ability of the enterprises to assume their obligations, measured through their 
performance is also favourably affected, but the firms make their decisions on the basis of 
their realised profits two quarters earlier. In practice, the enterprises need some time to 
decide whether or not to borrow from the banking system. This is explained with the need 
to take a decision on basis of the result from a past period, not on the basis of the current 
result, which in fact does not give a clear idea of whether the enterprise will be able to 
realise a similar result in the next period. This allows comparability with the results 
obtained in the subsequent periods.  
Interest levels on euro denominated long-term loans are also statistically significant. 
In general, only interest rates on euro denominated loans are important since the long-term 
loans in euro are a major share of the total loans of the enterprises
16. The reduced interest 
rates lead to higher credit demand. The inflation has no significant effect as was shown to 
the households.    
 
Table 3: Models for the non-financial enterprises behaviour in respect to acquired 
financial assets and incurred financial liabilities (1998-2005) 
 
                                                 
16 At the end of 2005, 67% of the long-term credits of non-financial enterprises are in euro, while the long-
term credits in the total credits of the enterprises are 67.8 %.   15
Variables  Net change in financial 
assets 
Net change in financial 
liabilities 
    
DUMMY0205   -4256.86 
   (-8.84) 
DUMMY0105 3019.30  2419.05 
 (7.81)  (4.68) 
∆ Gross operating surplus/gross 
mixed income 
0.14  
 (2.03)   
Interest rates on time deposits in 
BGN (-1) 
553.10  
 (3.27)   
Exchange rate, end of period  -751.27   
 (-2.71)   
Net change in financial assets (-1)  -0.41   
 (-4.46)   
∆ Intermediate consumption   0.40 
   (4.53) 
Net change in financial liabilities (-
1) 
 0.43 
   (4.65) 
∆ Gross operating surplus/gross 
mixed income (-2) 
 0.75 
   (5.17) 
∆ Interest rates on long-term credits 
in euro 
 -106.6 
   (-1.69) 
Net change in financial liabilities (-
2) 
 0.50 
   (6.58) 
    
R-squared 0.81  0.86 
Adjusted R-squared  0.77  0.82 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.41  2.28 
Comment: In the brackets the t-statistics of the explaining variables are given. 
 
The dynamics of financial assets and liabilities of sector General Government is 
determined by the specifics of the CB arrangement in the country, due to the fact that the 
actions of the government have an impact the amount of the foreign reserves and the 
government’s deposit with Issue Department at the BNB
17 respectively. For that reason the 
foreign reserves are included as an explanatory variable in the model of the change in the 
financial assets of the General Government, of which deposits are an essential part
18.  
                                                 
17 About details concerning the specifics of the CB in Bulgaria see Nenovsky and Hristov (2002), Petranov 
and Miller (2001) 
18 The increase in foreign reserves leads not only to the increase in reserve funds, but also to the increase in 
government’s deposit. This is due to the specifics of the Bulgarian CB its automatic mechanism is disrupted 
(Nenovsky, Hristov (2002)). One other important part of the government securities is the foreign 
government securities, which are kept as collateral on the issued Brady bonds. During the analyzed period a   16
The government uses the fiscal reserve for the external and internal debt payments, 
and as a result any increase in interest rates reduces the deposit of the government and 
leads accordingly to a decline in the change of the government’s financial assets (Table 4). 
Deposits also depend on the government’s consumption measured by the collective 
consumption and the final consumption expenditure. Any increase in the relevant 
consumption expenditure should reduce the corresponding deposits of the government, as it 
is supported by the evaluated statistically significant coefficient.   
The change in the financial liabilities of the General Government is explained by 
means of breaking down the financial instruments by type – loans and securities. This is on 
the assumption that loans depend on the interests of international institutions and creditors 
more than securities do. The government has the leading and active role for securities (due 
to the difference in the procedure of borrowing of funds through securities). 
The borrowing of funds by means of issuing securities largely depends on the 
macroeconomic situation; therefore indicators characterizing the country’s economic 
environment are used. For that purpose, the GDP growth, inflation and direct foreign 
investments are taken into account. All indicators show positive dependence on the change 
in the securities. In a situation of stability and good indicators of macroeconomic 
development external creditors have higher incentive to invest their funds in another 
country and thus increase the acquisition of government securities. The six-month LIBOR 
also affects the issuance of debt, because an increase of the interest rate abroad increases 
the costs for the issuer and accordingly the government refrains from issuing the new 
government securities
19.   
Credits are related to the change in external debt in their loan component. The factors 
causing credit dynamics should again be associated with the stability and development of 
the Bulgarian economy. Similarly to the securities, an attempt has been made to evaluate 
the dependable variable, however with unsatisfactory results. The dynamics of the variable 
does not depend on certain factors but could rather be explained with a certain policy 
pursued by those in power. This is also linked with the interests of international institutions 
in extending targeted loans for the development of specific areas, for structural reforms in 
the period of transition, etc.  
                                                                                                                                                    
reduction of this financial asset is observed as a result of the actions undertaken by the government for the 
restructuring of the debt in 2002 and its redemption in the last years of the analyzed period.  
19 Interest payments on Bulgarian Brady bonds are determined based on the six-month LIBOR.   17
The factors included in the regressions to explain the dynamics of credits are: 
inflation, GDP, and direct foreign investments in the country. However, all these indicate 
bad statistical characteristics and are therefore excluded from the presented results. The 
only variable with a significant coefficient is the government’s balance
20. When the surplus 
increases (respectively the deficit decreases) the need of additional loans falls (i.е. the 
functional relation should be negative). The coefficient of the independent variable with a 
lag of three in the evaluated equation for credits is negative, which confirms the expected 
dependence. The lag of the independent variable relates to the government need to take a 
decision (some time after deficits/surpluses have been realized) for the way of deficit 
financing, respectively the way of utilizing the realized surplus. In case of additional 
financing need arises, the government to have a time to settle the interrelations with the 
respective external creditor by means of loans.  
Table 3: Models for the General government sector behaviour in respect to acquired 
financial assets and incurred financial liabilities (1998-2005) 
 
Variables  Net change in 
financial assets 
Change in securities 
(liabilities) 
Change in loans 
(liabilities) 
      
DUMMY0105 -1510.97     
 (-4.9)     
Change in securities 
(liabilities)(-1) 
 0.51   
   (3.36)   
∆ Foreign direct investments in 
Bulgaria(-1) 
 0.09   
   (3.32)   
∆ Inflation (-1)    0.44   
   (2.04)   
∆ LIBOR (six months) (-1)    -64.78   
   (-1.78)   
∆ GDP(-1)    0.02   
   (1.60)   
@SEAS(1)   -186.98   
   (-4.45)   
∆ Budget surplus/deficit(-3)      -0.2 
     (-2.37) 
Change in loans (liabilities)(-3)      0.2 
     (1.54) 
@SEAS(3)    -221.3 
     (-2.58) 
∆ Government consumption  -0.99     
                                                 
20 Measured by the difference between the total incomes and total expenditure of the government in the 
consolidated fiscal program, i.e. this is the deficit or surplus of the government, which is not exactly 
equal to the net lending/net borrowing.   18
 (-4.50)     
∆ Interest rates payments  -1.10     
 (-4.32)     
@SEAS(4) -325.82     
 (-2.44)     
∆ International reserves  0.39     
 (3.73)     
      
R-squared 0.75  0.52  0.27 
Adjusted R-squared  0.71  0.41  0.22 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.12  1.88  1.91 
Comment: In the brackets the t-statistics of the explaining variables are given. 
 
Despite the limitations of the econometric tests, the results provide some 
information, which can be used to discuss the presented theoretical hypothesis.  
 
ІV.  Discussion  
 
The empirical analysis of the financial wealth across the institutional sectors 
outlines some major trends.  
The households continue to be the main net creditors in the Bulgarian economy in 
the period 1998-2005 in spite of the slowdown of the rates in financial wealth growth. This 
slowdown could be interpreted with the exhausting role of the monetary regime change for 
the increase of the financial wealth of the households due to the possibilities of realizing 
additional benefits from stabilizing the macroeconomic environment and ensuring 
relatively predictable conditions. The decreasing role of the monetary regime starts to be 
compensated partially through the fiscal policy, which after 2002 is strongly restrictive. In 
turn it leads to the transformation of the government from net debtor to net creditor in the 
economy. These conclusions support the hypothesis of the diminishing marginal utility of 
the currency board (the monetary regime) and the increasing marginal utility of the fiscal 
policy (see Chart 4). 
The government turns into a creditor in the last years of the analysed period by 
starting a policy of reducing the external debt (which is in unison with the fulfilment of the 
Maastricht criteria for euro area membership). This policy leads to reducing the role of the 
external creditors, i.e. the government sector to some extent frees itself from the external 
creditors and becomes more dependent on the internal creditors. It should be underlined, 
however, that the government’s relieving itself from the burden of the strong dependency 
on foreign investors and the policy of curbing credit growth in the Bulgarian economy in   19
late 2004 and early 2005 led to distortion of market mechanisms and to increasing reliance 
of the non-financial enterprises on the rest of the world. In other words, the CB in essence 
enhances the role of the internal and external creditors, contrary to the role of debtors, who 
were determining with their interests and power in the period before the change of the 
monetary regime. This also confirms our hypothesis that the CB introduction leads to the 
enhancing role of creditors at the expense of debtors. There are reasons to maintain that the 
declining effectiveness of the CB as a regime protecting mainly the interests of creditors is 
compensated more and more by the fiscal policy which partially takes over its role (after 
point А, Chart 4, the roles of the CB and the fiscal policy change)
21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chart 4: Marginal utility (effectiveness) of the CB and the fiscal policy  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 One of the first to draw conceptually the attention to the importance of studying the marginal utility 
(effectiveness) of the CB was Georgy Chobanov (2005).   20
 
In the period after the CB introduction a change is observed with regard to the 
significance of some factors, which were determining for the economic agents’ behaviour. 
Over this period it is established that inflation is not determinative of the behaviour of 
households, non-financial enterprises and the government sector. The reason for this is 
achieving low and predictable levels of inflation in the years after the monetary regime 
change. Before the CB introduction it is considered as the leading factors, which determine 
the acquisition of financial assets or real assets. The exchange rate, on the other hand, still 
retains its significance for the change in the financial assets of the households and 
enterprises, but it could be expected that its role will diminish in the future. The importance 
of the exchange rate still relates to the need for some time to pass in order for the economic 
agents to reorient and link to the euro (as a result of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU). 
The factors that determine the behaviour of households and non-financial enterprises are 
mainly incomes measured respectively with the wages and salaries and the firms’ realized 
result (gross operating surplus and gross mixed income). The increase of incomes of these 
economic agents increases their financial wealth.  
Thus, there are reasons to maintain that the change of the monetary regime is not 
only caused by significant disproportions in the balance of power between debtors and 
creditors, but the CB itself also impacts the dynamics of the financial wealth of the main 
creditor and debtor sectors. It could be presumed that with time there is internal, 
endogenous (cyclic) dynamics within the relation “monetary regime – distribution of 
Marginal Utility 
(effectiveness) 
Monetary regime 
(Currency Board) 
Fiscal regime 
1997 
A  21
financial wealth”, which leads to transformation (reversal) of the “financial roles” of the 
major institutional sectors. This reversal, of course not always complete, leads to reducing 
the marginal utility of the CB from the perspective of the leading actors, and which in order 
not to result in collapse could be compensated through alternative institutional behaviours 
(in this case by means of restrictive fiscal policy that leads to financial surplus in the public 
sector, point А of Chart 4).  
The above ideas are presented in most general terms; the specific mechanisms of 
the presented endogenous dynamics need be studied in detail. 
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Annex  – Bulgaria – empirical illustration (1994(5)-2001) 
Table 1 Main focal variable (1994-2001) 
  1994 1995 1996 06/1997  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Inflation (%, eop)  121.9  32.9  310.8  484.2  16.2*  1.0  6.2  11.3  4.8 
Real  wages  (USD)  89  110  75  6  78  101 108 105 114 
Real interest rate on deposits (%)  na  33,7  -50.4  -73.6  -12.54*  2  -2.7  -7.5  -1.7 
Real yield on treasury bonds (%)  na  11.6  -47.8  -53.3  -7.1*  5  -0.7  -6.5  -0.2 
Foreign  debt/GDP  128.8  73.3  243.5  103.6 84.1 72.9 70.1 73.7 67 
Domestic  debt/GDP  52.1 39.3 60.1 23.6  16  13.8  12.5  6.9  6.6 
∆Foreign debt/ ∆Domestic  debt  0.87  0.87  0.82  3.01  1.20 1.00 1.07 1.90 0.95 
Foreign reserves (mln USD)  1311  1546  793  1626  2474.1  3051.1  3221.6  3460.3  3580.3 
Foreign reserve growth   35.9  17.9  -48.7  105.1  52.2  23.3  5.6  7.4  3.5 
Foreign reserves in months of import   3.1  2.8  1.5  1.0  5.1  6.1  5.9  5.4  5.0 
Price of Brady bonds  21.72 23.95 33.27 46.4  54  59  62.5  72.8  79.7 
Fiscal  reserve  (mln  BGN)  na  na  na  1154  1601 1900 2693 2609 2571 
Bad and doubtful loans (in  % of total 
loan) 
82.3  74.1  46.3 na 41.8 31  26.7 17.3 7.7 
Seniorage  /GDP  na  4.4  4.9  na  0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2  1.1 
Interest rate expend./ total expend.  31.9  44.9  63.1  na  38  24.9  9.1  9.6  9.1 
 
Source: BNB, NSI, our estimation, note : * - compared to 06/1997.  
Real interest rate was calculated using Fischer formula, 
π +
+
= +
1
1
1
i
r , where r - real rate, i – nominal rate and π – inflation.  
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Annex – Redistribution of the financial wealth of the economic agents in the Bulgarian 
economy in 1998 and 2005 
 
 
Commercial 
banks
2 
General 
Government 
Rest of the World 
Households 
Non-financial enterprises and 
non-bank financial institutions 
BNB
3 
BGN 442.7 mln 
BGN 1.5 mln 
BGN 673.7 mln  BGN 56.1 mln 
BGN 32.4 mln
4
BGN 2.5 mln 
BGN 202.7 mln 
BGN 426.8 mln 
BGN 355.3 mln. 
BGN 665 mln 
BGN 247.3 mln 
BGN 13.7 mln 
BGN 570.1 mln. 
1 The financial flows are accounted according to the statistics of the respective sector. 
2 Net lending/net borrowing of the commercial banks could be received after adding of the non-classified assets and liabilities from the 
monetary statistic. 
3 Net lending/net borrowing of the BNB could be received after adding of the non-classified assets and liabilities from the monetary statistic. 
4 The financial flow is accounted according to the monetary statistic.  
5 The financial flow is accounted according to the consolidated fiscal program.   
 
26
26
 
Commercial 
banks
2 
General 
Government 
Rest of the World 
Households 
Non-financial enterprises and 
non-bank financial institutions
BNBБ
3 
BGN 6.95 mln 
BGN 79.3 mln 
BGN 330.4 mln 
BGN 174.8 mln 
BGN 809.8 mln
4
BGN 337.9 mln 
BGN 324.9 mln 
BGN 767.7 mln 
BGN 1878.9 mln 
BGN 990.5 mln 
BGN 2439.9 mln
5 
BGN 403 mln 
BGN 5232.1  mln 
1 The financial flows are accounted according to the statistics of the respective sector. 
2 Net lending/net borrowing of the commercial banks could be received after adding of the non-classified assets and liabilities from the 
monetary statistic. 
3 Net lending/net borrowing of the BNB could be received after adding of the non-classified assets and liabilities from the monetary statistic. 
4 The financial flow is accounted according to the monetary statistic.  
5 The financial flow is accounted according to the consolidated fiscal program.   
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